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ABSTRACT 
Offshoring manufacturing to low labor cost countries has become trendy. Nearly 
everyday one sees an announcement in the business press of companies moving to China 
or India. Whilst production cost is an important consideration in choosing a location for 
the factory, we argue that one should not become victim of a herd effect and that other 
parameters e.g. quality, flexibility, transportation and energy costs, etc. need to be taken 
into consideration in the determination of the optimal manufacturing network. Relocating 
a factory is changing the strategic architecture of the company’s manufacturing network 
and requires a long term view and a good model to design the architecture of the 
manufacturing network. Based on empirical survey research and a set of case studies we 
provide such a model to think about the roles of factories in the strategic manufacturing 
network of the firm. But we go beyond a classification and a descriptive model and we 
provide a set of six managerial issues that require senior management’s attention in 
determining the optimal manufacturing network and its dynamic evolution. We argue for 
example that senior management needs to build a balanced portfolio of different types of 
factories, has to have a performance measurement system adapted to the type of factory, 
as well as the appropriate leadership for each of the different types of factories and needs 
to actively manage the dynamics and the flows of innovation in the factory network. 
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OFFSHORING IS BECOMING TRENDY 
Offshoring production, or what you would call with a politically more loaded 
term delocalization, has become common practice in manufacturing industries, especially 
in industrialized countries such as the USA, Japan and western European countries, but 
often also in the newly emerging economies like Singapore, Korea or Taiwan. High labor 
costs have forced manufacturing companies in these economies to consider to reduce or 
even close down their factories and to shift these manufacturing activities to countries 
with lower wages. This shift is not new. It has taken place in the eighties in labor 
intensive industries, such as textile and assembly of consumer electronics. However, it is 
also gradually taking place in more capital intensive industries, such as automotive, 
chemicals and pharmaceutics. Poland has production facilities for Fiat, Toyota and 
General Motors; PSA Peugeot-Citroen and Toyota are building a joint factory for the 
assembly of small cars in the Czech Republic; Thailand has become the ‘Detroit’ of the 
East; and tyre producers are following the automotive factories eastward. 
Nearly everyday we see announcements in the business press of companies 
moving to low labour cost countries. There seems to be almost a herd effect. It is to the 
point to ask whether there is perhaps something wrong with this trend. A good argument 
against offshoring is the increasing distance from the consumers and markets, which 
translates into higher transportation costs. Consequently, for products with low value 
density it seems less obvious to create factories at the other side of the world. The 
bottling of soft drink, for example, is likely to remain close to its markets. Even if labor 
cost is high in a country, one may well expect to find a few soft drink bottling factories in 
this country, because of the proximity to the consumers. Yet, although it seems 
contradictory, low value density may also be exactly the reason for relocation. Packaging, 
for example, is typically a product with low value density. The packaging factory will 
therefore remain close to the food factory or the consumer electronics factory it serves. If 
these customers then relocate in search of lower labor costs, the packaging factory may 
well decide to follow.  
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The discussion on offshoring or delocalization is a controversial one. 
Downgrading or closure of factories creates unemployment. In the long term, it may well 
destroy the manufacturing base of the industrialized countries, changing these economies 
into service economies rather than industrial economies. This may lead to an overall 
lower growth in productivity, and an expectation of lower welfare in the long term. On 
the other hand, offshoring reduces the cost and therefore the price of the products, which 
implies that the consumer wins.  
We have the impression that currently manufacturers in industrialized countries 
rush into offshoring and that the argument in favor of lower labor costs in China or in 
India prevails strongly over other considerations. Whilst the production cost is an 
important consideration, especially in commodity industries with strong pressure on 
prices, one has to be careful in emphasizing too strongly the costs as a competitive factor. 
We fear that all too soon manufacturers will forget about the equilibrium that needs to 
exist in their network of production units. Success in manufacturing is not only about 
cost, but it is equally about quality, responsiveness, innovation and fast delivery. 
Therefore, a long-term view of the manufacturing network is needed. Labor costs evolve 
quite fast over time, which may erode the advantage gained from the new location. 
Factories which had been established in the Chinese coastal provinces are now moving 
inland, as labor costs are rising in Shanghai or Shenzen. Factories located in Poland have 
experienced an increase in wages of about 300% over the past ten years. If factories are 
relocated in search of lower labor costs, one has to realize that this advantage is a 
temporary one, even if “temporary” still means a fairly long period of time. Labor cost is 
only one element of the total cost. Other parameters that should be taken into account are 
the changes in transportation costs, the difference in productivity, or the difference in 
energy costs. In the chemical industry, for example, the cost of energy may play a role in 
the decision to expand or reduce the capacity of the factory. Pursuing a short term labor 
cost advantage, but at the same time destroying a long term manufacturing strategy does 
not sound to be the best approach for long term competitiveness.  
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YOU NEED TO DEVELOP A STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE FACTORY 
NETWORK 
Whilst we acknowledge the importance of cost optimizations in the 
manufacturing network, we also strongly believe that the decision to relocate a factory 
should be taken within a broader perspective. Relocating a factory means the company is 
changing its manufacturing network. This is a strategic decision, which will have an 
impact on the competitiveness of the company. The delocalization decision should 
therefore be taken with this strategic network perspective in mind.  
The manufacturing strategy literature provides some models or frameworks that 
support the manager in this decision. Hayes and Schmenner classify factories according 
to their focus, which can be the market, the product or a step in the process. Market 
focused factories will be more responsive to customer needs, while product or process 
focused factories enable the company to benefit from specialization and to build on its 
capabilities (Hayes and Schmenner, 1978). The choice between these three dimensions of 
focus will depend on the characteristics of the industry. For example, one would expect 
food factories to be closer to the market, while chemical factories will rather be where 
capabilities can be easily exploited. 
Kasra Ferdows (1997) added a different perspective to the discussion. At the core 
of his framework is the observation that each factory has a strategic role to fulfill: its role 
may for example be to serve a market, to act as a low-cost source of products or 
components, or to take the lead in the development and transfer of innovations. The 
concept of the lead factory, which shares its innovations and knowledge with other 
factories, stresses the idea that multinational manufacturing companies are more than a 
set of factories. Rather, their manufacturing configuration is a network, and should be 
managed as such. The strength of an international company lies in its potential to build 
and exploit a network of knowledge, which goes far beyond its potential to minimize 
costs.  
In our own work we have extended this view. Traditionally a manufacturing 
network is seen as a supply chain, with goods (components, semi-finished products or 
end products) flowing between the factories in the network. But it can also be described 
as a network of knowledge, with innovations and information flowing between the 
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factories. We actually argue, similar to Doz, Santos and Williamson, that the strength of a 
multinational manufacturing company lies precisely in its potential to exploit its network 
of knowledge (Doz, Santos and Williamson 2001). Doz et al use this idea with respect to 
the product and service innovations developed by the firm. We apply this network 
concept to process innovation and manufacturing. As a consequence we present a model 
that classifies factories according to their role in this network of knowledge.  
The argument we would like to put forward is that a relocation decision should 
take into account the role the factory plays in the network of knowledge in the company. 
In moving the factory, we are changing the strategic architecture of the network. And this 
may well completely upset or even destroy the medium to long term equilibrium in the 
network in order to obtain short term gains. More specifically, we may be hurting the 
innovation flows in the network. This would be really detrimental to the long term 
success of the network and the company and the question how the network is adjusted 
should be on the board’s mind in deciding about the future of a factory.  
 
ABOUT OUR RESEARCH 
Our proposals are based on in-depth case research in eight multinational 
manufacturing companies, with headquarters in Western Europe. The confectionary 
producer Callebaut, now part of the global Barry-Callebaut group, was one of the cases, 
with manufacturing facilities in Belgium, the UK, Canada and the USA. Another 
interesting case has been Bekaert, producer of steel cord, which is a major supplier to the 
tire industry, with factories in Europe, Asia and the Americas. Also Samsonite Europe, 
producer of luggage, handbags, backpacks … was part of our study. 
We conducted interviews in these multinationals with executives in 
manufacturing and supply chain functions in headquarters; questionnaires have been sent 
to the factory managers and their management teams in each of the factories in the 
multinational network. The conclusions drawn from this research have been discussed 
with many managers from many different companies, in many different industries in 
executive programs and during consulting projects. Their reactions and comments have 
been structured and are integrated in this paper and render our results much more robust.  
 
 8 
Moreover the insights from some case studies developed over the last ten years 
have been added to this paper. Examples of these case studies are Francolor Pigments, a 
pigments production organization with two factories in France, which used to be part of 
ICI, and was then taken over by the Japanese company Toyo Ink (De Meyer and Probert, 
1998); Samsung Berlin, a factory of display devices and monitors in Berlin, taken over by 
Samsung in 1992 and which successfully operated till September 2005 (De Meyer and 
Pycke, 1996); TWL Pondicherry,  a factory that started as a joint venture between an 
Indian conglomerate and Whirlpool for the production and commercialization of washing 
machines (De Meyer and Probert, 1997); and Daewoo Poland, a Polish FSO automotive 
factory, taken over by Daewoo (De Meyer and Choi, 1999), and later on becoming part of 
GM.  
 
DESCRIBING OUR MODEL  
Based on our data, we can classify the factories in four broad though essential 
categories of factories. The four categories differ mainly in the extent to which the 
factories have established network relationships with other factories in the network 
and/or with headquarters. As stated earlier, our focus has been on the role of the factories 
in the network of knowledge. Thus we have studied the knowledge flows in the 
manufacturing network. These knowledge flows have different “formats”. An important 
one is the transfer of innovations in the network. Indeed, an explicit flow of knowledge 
takes place whenever innovations developed in a site are transferred to and implemented 
in a factory in the network. A second and informal flow of knowledge occurs when 
managers of different sites talk to each other, or visit one another’s site. Therefore, the 
level of communication between managers across factories has been measured, as well as 
the number of days manufacturing staff people from each factory have visited the other 
factories in the network. The detailed description of the knowledge flows and of the 
clustering procedure can be found in Vereecke et al (forthcoming). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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Based on all these measurements we were able to distinguish four types or 
categories of factories. The first category of factories consists of the “isolated” factories 
in the network. Few innovations reach this isolated factory and few innovations are 
transferred from here to other units; few manufacturing staff people come to visit such a 
factory, and in reverse also few manufacturing staff people from this factory go visit 
other factories. Moreover, there is little communication between the manufacturing staff 
people of this factory and the other manufacturing managers in the network. The can 
producer in our research showed quite a few isolated factories. These factories are 
typically high performers, supplying commodity products to their local market, and 
relying on their own capabilities to improve their manufacturing processes. Some of them 
are green field factories, which run in an efficient, reliable and independent way.  
Similar to the isolated factories are the “receiver factories”. They differ from the 
isolated factories on one aspect only: they receive quite a few innovations from other 
factories in the network and/or from headquarters. There can be a few different reasons 
for this ‘injection’ of innovations in the receiver factory. Some of these factories are 
underperforming, and need external support to get the factory up to standard. Others are 
located so close to one of the sister factories, that they are run as ‘satellite factories’, 
under the supervision of the management team of the neighboring, typically larger, 
factory. Still other factories have to rely on external support to keep up to speed with 
rapidly changing technological innovation. A nice example in this respect is a state-of-
the-art steel cord factory. This factory was the experimental unit in the network for the 
application of Computer-integrated Manufacturing. It was supposed to become the 
‘model factory’ for the future, with zero defects and zero interruptions. In order to 
accomplish this, the factory received a lot of support from other factories and from 
development teams in the company. 
The third category of factories is very different. This category consists of factories 
that have established strong network relationships. These network players show a high 
level of communication with other units in the network and they exchange a lot of 
innovations with the other units. They not only transfer innovations to the other factories, 
they also benefit from innovations developed elsewhere. Typical for these factories is that 
they are frequently hosting visitors from other factories in the network and from 
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headquarters. This is why we have labeled them the ‘hosting network players’. Quite a 
few of the hosting network players in our research were the factory closest to 
headquarters. They thus had automatically a central position in the network. Some 
interviewees referred to this factory as the ‘mother factory’. An example of a hosting 
network player was the steel cord factory located about 50 km from the Bekaert 
headquarters. This factory was very flexible, and produced a large range of products, for 
a broad geographical market; its location close to the technical development center in 
headquarters turned this factory into a prototype testing center; engineers from all over 
the world would go through training in this factory; finally, the factory was considered to 
be a center of excellence for part of the product range of the company. 
The main difference between the hosting network players and our fourth category, 
the ‘active network players’, lies in the intensity of communication and of innovation 
transfers, and the dominant direction of the flows of visitors. These are factories that 
communicate intensively with other units in the network; they share very actively 
innovations with other units; and they are not only hosting visitors from other factories, 
they also pay lots of visits to the other factories.  
An interesting example of an active network player was a small Samsonite factory 
in Belgium, close to the product design center in the European headquarters. This factory 
was a pilot center for new designs of luggage. It compensated for its high labor cost by 
excelling in the production of small runs of new products, with short delivery times. 
When the new product matured, it was then transferred to low-cost factories in Eastern 
Europe. 
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SIX MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES FROM THE BOARD’S AND TOP 
MANAGEMENT’S PERSPECTIVE 
The real question now is “so what?”. Is this an interesting classification that helps 
academics to analyze international manufacturing networks, but just that? Or can a board 
use this model to reflect on the strategic architecture of its factory network? We are 
convinced that this classification can be very helpful to structure strategic thinking about 
the manufacturing network. We have developed six areas that require attention of the 
senior management and the board.  
 
Every company needs a balanced portfolio of factories 
Let’s enter the board room or the executive committee meeting of the 
multinational, and join its discussion on the portfolio of factories. We’d like to imagine 
that these executives are in front of a large chess board. On the board are the different 
factories of their network. They’re not runners, towers, king or queen. They are isolated 
factories, receivers, hosting network players and active network players. And the 
executives are deciding on the tactics of their game. Their first question probably is how 
many of each they would like to keep in the game. Do they need factories of each type? 
Or are some types redundant, or even counter-productive in the competitive game?  
Would it be possible for the company to survive without any network players? 
The answer is probably “no”, since the innovations that come out of these networkers are 
crucial for the sustainable competitiveness of the company. Hosting network players are 
the sources of innovations in the manufacturing network, and should therefore be part of 
the game. However, the size of the factory may at some point in time create diseconomies 
of scale. Or the location of the hosting network player, which is often close to the 
headquarters or to where the roots of the company are, may not be the optimal location to 
tap into new trends. If this is the case, the need for some active network players will arise. 
This probably explains why large pharmaceutical companies, e.g. Novartis from 
Switzerland, have established a factory in California where they are close to the 
development of know-how in biogenetic engineering.  
 
 12 
But let’s face it, network players are expensive factories. Their role as developers 
of knowledge implies a need for investments and resources. Being networkers probably 
even implies some inefficiency. Their managers spend a lot of time traveling, the visitors 
in their factories “disturb” the normal operations in the factory, training takes time, 
networking also means time in meetings and other forums where information is shared. 
As a consequence, these factories should be allowed some slack capacity to be able to 
fulfill their role of hosts and network players. It wouldn’t be wise to allow for these 
inefficiencies in all factories.  
Therefore, the network players should be complemented with some isolated 
factories, which are run in a very lean, efficient and low cost way, as such safeguarding 
the overall cost of the manufacturing network. Moreover, isolated factories offer strategic 
flexibility to the network. In case of a geographical expansion into new markets, these 
isolated factories can be used as the bricks in building the international manufacturing 
network. Copying the concept of a factory and replicating it in distant markets provides 
an easy and rapid way to start serving these distant markets and maybe even to start 
sensing trends in these markets, which may then stimulate the development of 
innovations in the network players. This idea of “copy/paste factories” is especially 
typical for companies with low value density products. A can producer, for example, will 
“copy/paste” similar factories all over its geographical market. 
Also, relocating isolated factories is relatively easy; it implies a relocation of 
capacity. The shift in production in the textile industry illustrates this point. Over a period 
of roughly ten to fifteen years, textile producers have shifted production from North 
Africa or Mexico, over Mauritius, to Bangladesh, and finally China. “Picking up” the 
machinery and moving it to another country seems to be a relatively easy job. 
Relocating network players is much more difficult. Their capability to serve as 
developers of knowledge may well be rooted in their location close to sources of 
knowledge or close to some specific expertise. For example, they may have a tight link to 
the R&D center of the company, or they may be located in a region with a long tradition 
of the company’s industrial activity. When Tupperware decided to build new facilities for 
its Belgian production, it could have decided to build the green field factory in a low 
labor cost country. However, management decided to build the new factory only a couple 
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of kilometers away from the old facilities. The reason? The know-how of its workforce, 
the nearness of R&D which allows for interaction between design and manufacturing and 
for experimentation on the shop floor. Another example are automotive producers e.g. 
Daimler Chrysler. This company will probably always have some manufacturing 
facilities in the “golden triangle” for automotive design and production between Stuttgart, 
Mulhouse and Torino, because of the blend of knowledge available in this area, through 
sophisticated suppliers, universities specializing in research on the automotive industry, 
machine construction, and design labs. Yet at some point in time, automotive companies 
may want to understand trends in Japanese car factories, which may give them a need for 
active network players, to tap into this knowledge. The Japanese Nissan factories in the 
Renault network may well have taken on the role of an active network player that brings 
Nissan’s knowledge in process engineering into the Renault network. Daimler Chrysler 
tried to do the same with Mitsubishi Motor Company, but failed to take advantage of this 
venture.  
Ultimately, one may even consider outsourcing the activity carried out in the 
isolated factory. In doing so, the total cost may be reduced, provided the activity is taken 
over by a partner who has specialized in it. Yet it doesn’t harm the innovation power of 
the network, since the factory isn’t sharing any important knowledge with the other 
players in the network. 
The same argument goes in favor of receiver factories. We need them in the 
network, for the same reasons as the isolated factories. For processes where technology is 
rapidly evolving, one probably needs receiver factories rather than isolated ones, which 
are usually better suited for standardized production. The concept of the receiver factory 
is to be used if the factory has to keep up to speed with the latest technologies. 
 
Do type of factory and geography go together? 
 
Is there some geographical preference for each of the types of factories? Would it 
be the case that isolated and receiver factories are typically located in low-labor cost 
countries? And that network players are by definition to be found in industrialized 
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countries? This, we are convinced, doesn’t always reflect reality. Especially active 
network players could – and probably should - be located all over the world. The main 
question here is where interesting sources of knowledge are to be found. Tapping into a 
source of knowledge, and transferring this knowledge across the network, is the primary 
task of an active network player.  
The story is different for isolated or receiver factories. Although in theory these 
factories can be located anywhere, presence in high wage countries is probably not 
sustainable. Imagine an isolated factory in an expensive country, in terms of labor cost, 
such as Japan, Switzerland or Belgium. This factory has a competitive disadvantage vis-
à-vis the other factories in the company’s network. If the company runs into 
overcapacity, the decision to reduce capacity may easily turn into a downsizing or even 
closure of this factory. In doing so, the company is simply “cutting out” capacity, without 
hurting any of its flows of innovation. The story would have been different if this factory 
were a network player. In this case, cutting capacity would also have meant cutting vital 
innovation flows, and therefore hurting the innovative capability and the competitiveness 
of the network. 
One of the Belgian factories in our study is a clear example. This factory acted as 
a receiver: expertise from other factories in the network and from headquarters was 
transferred to this factory in order to improve its performance. In reverse, however, the 
factory had no innovations or best practices that it could share with the other factories. In 
a period of downsizing, this factory was the first “victim” and was closed. 
Consequently, there is likely to be some self-selection among isolated and 
receiver factories in high wage countries. They either struggle for survival, or move 
towards lower wage countries. 
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Don’t compare apples with oranges: different types of factories needs to be 
evaluated on different criteria 
The previous discussion leads to the issue of performance measurement in the 
manufacturing network. If the decision on reduction or expansion of factories is to be 
made with the network role of the factories in mind, it implies that management needs a 
performance measurement system that takes these network roles into account.  
We have argued earlier that a typical isolated factory is a lean factory, established 
to serve its local market efficiently, often as a copy of one of its sister factories. It is clear 
that such a factory should be evaluated in terms of its cost and efficiency, as well as its 
market orientation. The latter can be measured through its delivery speed and reliability 
and the degree of service it gives to its market. Obviously, these measures are also 
important for the receiver factories. However, a receiver factory also has to absorb the 
innovations that come from other units in the network, and has to improve its 
performance through the adoption of these innovations. Therefore, it is more important to 
measure the rate of performance improvement than the absolute level of performance of 
this factory. Rather than evaluating the factory, for example, on its cost level, one should 
be evaluating it on its speed of cost reduction and of increase in productivity. To use the 
Balanced Score Card terminology, the performance evaluation of the factory should focus 
heavily on the learning capabilities in the factory. Does this factory implement the 
innovations it receives? Is this factory building competencies? Does it have the 
absorptive capacity needed to capture innovations and implement them successfully? 
The story is again different for network players. While cost, delivery and service 
can not be ignored here, the focus should be on the evaluation of the networking role of 
these factories. In order for these factories to add value to the network, they must remain 
a strong source of innovation. Consequently, measures of innovativeness are crucial 
benchmark elements. The number of new product introductions introduced in these 
factories, the number of successful process changes implemented in these factories, the 
number of improvement suggestions generated by the work force, may be interesting 
measures of performance in network players. 
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Hosting network players may require yet another measure of performance. From 
the earlier discussion, we remember that active network players are sort of “the new kid 
on the block”. This is very different from the typical hosting network player, which has 
been in the network for quite a long time, and is somewhat the “home place” for the 
managers in the distant factories. The role of the hosting network player is to preserve the 
heritage, to be the beating heart where the values and the mission of the company are 
maintained, to be the node in the network where the corporate culture is very much 
present and is passed on to others. While it is very difficult to measure and evaluate to 
what extent the factory really fulfills this role, some proxies can be defined as 
performance measures. An example may be the number of days of training delivered in 
this factory for managers coming from other factories in the network, or the number of 
colleagues that have visited this factory over the past year. Or the number of months 
managers of this factory have spent in other factories in the network. 
 
Tune the behavior of your factory management 
It is important to note here that in a benchmarking exercise one has to find the 
delicate balance between competitive and cooperative behavior in the factories. Network 
players should be motivated to share their innovations with other factories in the network. 
It is therefore risky to benchmark these factories in terms of their absolute performance 
on cost and productivity against isolated or receiving factories, since this might convince 
them that they’d better keep their performance improvements for themselves. Such a 
protective attitude would not only kill their crucial role of network player. It would also 
dry out the flow of innovative ideas they receive from their sister factories. Indeed, as one 
can see in Figure 1, the factory that shares innovations is also the one that receives 
innovations. As such, if the network player stops to share innovations, it will sooner or 
later also experience a reduced inflow of innovations; this in turn will weaken the 
innovativeness of this factory, which will in the long term undermine its capability to 
remain a network player. Stated differently, benchmarking is a useful tool in motivating 
factory management, and as such is making the network stronger. But it should be used 
with great care, in order to avoid a counter-productive effect. 
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Manage the evolution of the factory network 
So far, we have described the network of factories as a rather static picture. 
Indeed, at a certain point in time, the factories in the network all play a certain role. 
However, the network is changing over time, and the roles of the factories are dynamic. 
One may expect that open-minded and ambitious factory management teams will try to 
build network relations, will open their factories to sister factories, and will stimulate 
experimentation and innovation in their factories. If this entrepreneurship is allowed to 
take place, factories are likely to converge into network players. This evolution is well 
comparable to the trends described by Ferdows in his article on the strategic roles of 
factories (Ferdows 1997). Ferdows observed a spontaneous move “upward” in his 
framework. While some factories started as “off-shore” factories, producing products at a 
low cost, or as “servers”, simply creating output to serve their market, they gradually 
move into the role of “source factories” or “contributors”, which not only produce 
products, but also generate some knowledge in the network. Eventually, these factories 
may turn into “lead factories” or “centers of excellence”, thus becoming the source of 
knowledge and expertise for the other factories in the network. 
The question now is whether this spontaneous evolution is a positive thing. Is it 
beneficial for the network as a whole to allow for this entrepreneurship? Or should 
headquarters control the dynamics of the network? The answer to this question is like so 
often “it depends”. The framework around the transnational corporation developed by 
Bartlett and Ghoshal in the late eighties provides probably still the most useful 
perspective (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). As long as global integration is not at stake, it is 
probably best to leave the initiative in the hands of the local factory managers. The 
typical multidomestic company, which has to be very responsive to local market needs, 
will benefit from an entrepreneurial spirit in its manufacturing network. Let’s go back to 
the metaphor of the chess board in the executive committee of the company. The chess 
game in such a multidomestic company is probably played in a rather flexible way. When 
opportunities arise, the right piece enters the game. On the contrary, multinationals 
operating in a global environment in which it is crucial to globally integrate decision 
making, will benefit from a centralized view on the dynamics of the network. This is 
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where the tactics of the chess game are set explicitly prior to the game. This is where it is 
decided upfront which pieces are crucial in the game scenario. This is the kind of 
environment in which headquarters carefully balance the number of different factories. 
We have argued before that network players are necessary but expensive sources of 
knowledge, while isolated and receiver factories are lean and efficient sources generating 
production output. A truly global company will want to establish or maintain a limited 
number of network players, and will complement them with the isolated and receiver 
ones. The transnational environment then, where both global integration and local 
responsiveness are important, probably still requires the centralized view on the network. 
The difference with the global environment may lie in the number of network players. 
Because of the complexity of a transnational environment, the company has to rely more 
heavily on the knowledge flows in the network. As we have explained, knowledge flows 
are generated by these network players; as such, they have an important role in a 
transnational company.  
Don’t leave the management of the flows of innovation to chance 
 
Even though the intensity of the flows of knowledge between the factories is 
related to the number of network players in the network, this doesn’t mean knowledge 
will flow automatically. And it definitely doesn’t mean these flows of knowledge will be 
used effectively in the receiving factories. A knowledge network needs to be managed 
and requires investment in resources. As such, it requires attention and commitment from 
the managers in headquarters. 
Firstly, the transfer process needs to be designed and improved. It is important to 
create meeting places, real or virtual, where the network players can share their 
knowledge. Involving suppliers and customers in the network may well enrich the 
knowledge that is shared. Also, one has to pay a lot of attention to the translation of the 
knowledge into the local context. For example, it was interesting to observe how Korean 
managers in Samsung were constantly commenting on the need to ‘Germanize’ the 
Korean management systems to make them applicable in the Samsung Berlin factory. 
Moreover, it is important to create a few early successes in building the knowledge 
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network. Achievable short-term improvement targets, clear announcement when these 
results are obtained, on both the side of the sender and the receiver, have a strongly 
positive effect on the motivations for the knowledge sharing. The success of the French 
Francolor Pigments factory was given considerable attention at Toyo Ink in Japan, and 
the case of the Samsung factory in Berlin was used to illustrate to the middle 
management of Samsung the internationalization of the company in economies in 
transformation. 
Secondly, the resources need to be made available, both at the sending and at the 
receiving end. One adagio of teaching (which is a form of knowledge transfer) is: ‘teach 
only the teachables’. Something similar is true in knowledge networks. In other words, 
ensure that the adopter has the capabilities to turn knowledge into action. While this 
implies that the intrinsic quality of the workforce has to be of a sufficiently high standard 
in order to make it possible for them to absorb knowledge, at the same time one has to 
upgrade the quality of the workforce and the engineering team in order to render them 
susceptible to new knowledge. 
Equally important are the motivation and resource deployment for the transfer of 
knowledge at the sending end. The investment of Samsung to bring over a team of more 
than 230 engineers and technicians from the Korean host-factory to ‘clean up’ the Berlin 
factory, which was a receiver factory, is obviously an extreme and unusual case. The 
example of Whirlpool is equally interesting. They mobilised retired employees from the 
U.S. for a whole summer to work with groups of local staff in the Pondicherry factory 
(also a receiver in our classification), to teach them manufacturing processes, to redesign 
the factory lay-out and raise productivity levels, and to work on special skills 
development to address the product design weaknesses, which were affecting 
manufacturing costs and product quality.  
It is interesting to see how the success of knowledge flows to a large extent relies 
on personal relationships. The relationships may be both on a personal level between 
factory managers, or between groups of people, e.g. the workers in two factories. The 
successful integration of Francolor in the Japanese company was to a very large extent 
due to the quality of the relationship between the French senior manager and the 
European representative of Toyo Ink. At the same time the 1-3-6 training system 
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implemented by Samsung had the improvement of relations between groups of workers 
as a consequence. This system consisted of one Korean taking care of 3 German workers 
for an in-depth visit of the Korean factory during 6 days. 
Another intriguing observation has been that, although effective networks have a 
constant flow of technological knowledge, this flow was not steady and continuous. In 
fact we saw that knowledge was transferred in big bursts, alternated with periods of 
constant but relatively low flows of knowledge.  
 
AND WHAT ABOUT THE FACTORY MANAGER: HOW CAN SHE DEFEND 
HER FACTORY? 
Our research findings also include a warning signal for the factory manager, 
especially in those factories located in high labor cost countries. Such factories are at a 
cost disadvantage, compared to their sister factories in the network, unless they can 
compensate for the high cost of labor by reaching high productivity levels. For managers 
in network players, the tendency may exist not to share knowledge with others, so as to 
keep the productivity improvements to the factory. Such a protective attitude will not 
only hinder the network to improve its overall performance, it will also bring the factory 
in an isolated position. As we have just shown, this will constrain the flows of knowledge 
the factory may expect to receive in the future, and as such may in the long term reduce 
the innovative power of the factory. But even worse, it will change the role the factory 
plays in the network. If sooner or later the company needs to reduce capacity, this factory 
will be an easy victim. By downsizing this factory, the company will have accomplished 
its objective to reduce capacity, without hurting the knowledge flows in the network. At 
the end of the trip, an attempt to protect the factory may well have turned into a scenario 
of making the factory abundant.  
Managers in isolated or receiving factories should realize that the role of their 
factory is merely to provide capacity to the network. If, as argued above, capacity in the 
network needs to be reduced because of a declining market, or if cost reductions can be 
obtained by relocating the factories, these factories may well be on the shortlist for 
closure. In industries with low value density, where proximity to the market is an 
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important issue, this is not likely to take place. However, if transportation distance is not 
a major criterion for factory location, the future of the factory may be at stake. From the 
perspective of headquarters, this is exactly the strategic flexibility that has purposely been 
built into the network. From the perspective of the factory management, this is hard to 
swallow, since it involves lay-offs and therefore has an impact on the life of the 
employees and their families, as well as, in the long term, on the welfare in a region. 
This brings us back to the discussion on delocalization. While strategically 
important to safeguard and improve the competitiveness of the multinational, it is often 
perceived as unavoidable and yet unfair at the level of the factory. It is our belief that 
indeed it is unavoidable for some of the isolated and receiving factories in high labor cost 
countries. Consequently, these factories may protect themselves, not by complaining 
when it is too late, but rather by anticipating through building network relationships. This 
takes time, it requires careful strategic planning, and the willingness of headquarters to 
invest in these network relationships. Network players on the other hand should 
understand the importance of their role in the network, and should keep on investing in 
their own innovation capability, as well as in the transfer of their knowledge to the other 
players in the network. While sharing their knowledge may seem too generous in the 
short term, it is precisely their reason for existence, and their guarantee for survival in the 
long term. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
So what’s our advice to the senior management in multinational manufacturing 
companies? Let’s summarize it in a few short messages: 
 
• Do not follow the herds in the short term. You may need to relocate factories 
to low cost production countries and we all may have to go to China or India. 
But look beyond the cost of the manufacturing network: develop a truly 
strategic view of the factory network. And remember: a network is more than 
the nodes, it is also about the flows and the ties these nodes have developed 
with the local environment. 
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• The network benefits from diversity; search for a good balance in the roles 
played by the factories in the network. Keep in mind in which environment 
the multinational operates. Different environments require different sets of 
roles for the factories. 
• Different roles require different performance measures. Use benchmarking 
with great care. 
• Knowledge networks require attention, commitment and resources. In 
particular, personal relationships should be nurtured for knowledge transfers 
to take place. 
• The role of a factory in a network should be dynamic. But the control over the 
se dynamics should not be left to the hands of the factory managers only. 
Then you would have only an evolution of the individual nodes. There is a 
need for a coordinated evolution of the network, i.e. of both its nodes and its 
flows 
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FIGURE 1 
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